The Journal

The Project



"This is a very fine collection of essays about David Lewis’s work. Centered around such central Lewisian doctrines as Humean supervenience, modal realism, the counterfactual analysis of causation, and physicalism, the collection is a fitting tribute to his outstanding work and to its influence."
Jeremy Butterfield, University of Cambridge

"This collection gathers papers on David Lewis’s metaphysics. Since the editors have assembled a superb group of authors, the result is at the cutting edge of the best work in contemporary metaphysics. Together with Lewis’s writings it would make for an outstanding seminar in metaphysics."
Ernest Sosa, Brown University

"David Lewis’s work occupies a central place in contemporary metaphysics, and in this volume some of our leading metaphysicians comment, interpret, and critically appraise Lewis’s important and influential claims and arguments on issues like modality and possible worlds, Humean supervenience, endurance and perdurance, counterfactuals and time, causation, and the mind-body problem. This is a timely and highly useful collection indispensable to students of Lewis’s work in metaphysics and philosophy of mind."
Jaegwon Kim, Brown University



Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt (Eds.)

Reality and Humean Supervenience

Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis


Reality and Humean Supervenience: Some Reflections on David Lewis' Philosophy, Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt

I Modal Realism

Phillip Bricker: Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality  

John Bigelow: Time Travel Fictions    

Paul Teller: Lewis's Defence of Counterpart Theory

Harold W. Noonan: The Case of Perdurance

II Physicalism, Causations and  

Daniel Bonevac: Naturalism for the Faint of Heart  

D. M. Armstrong: The Open Door: Counterfactual vs. Singularist Theories of Causation  
Jonathan Bennett: On Forward and Backward Counterfactual Conditionals

III The Reduction of Mind  

Terence Horgan: Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization and the Reduction of Mind  

Michael Tye: Knowing what it is like: The  Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument 




Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, USA 2001