Integrating Differences: Philosopical Aspects in Sociology and Vice Versa

Edited by Georg Peter and Reuss-Markus Krausse

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Integrating Differences: Philosopical Aspects in Sociology and Vice Versa

Georg Peter and Reuss-Markus Krausse

This is Volume 40 of our scientific journal ProtoSociology: We never thought we would come this far. This means that the ProtoSociology project is also thirty-three years old. But speaking of age and numbers, this volume is especially dedicated to Gerhard Preyer and his work, who doubles the number of volumes in years. He is the editor and founder of the journal and is responsible for the progress and development of the project of the same name. In a mixture of reconstruction and retrospective, it might be a good idea to start with the more programmatic concept:

The term "ProtoSociology" is partly inspired by Paul Lorenzen's constructive theory of language and science, which encouraged the project in its initial phase to establish a proto-theoretical approach in sociology. Prototheories are conceived there as the foundation of a specialized science. Based on initial objectives and linguistic distinctions, they attempt to contribute to the methodological structure of a specialized language and to systematize the preliminary understanding of the object and experiential realm of the social sciences. In other words, proto-sociology is primarily a meta-theoretical enterprise.

The approaches to such systematization are fed by the three dominant currents in twentieth-century philosophy:

- the analytic philosophy of language, beginning with Frege, Wittgenstein, and Carnap,
- the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and
- Heidegger's hermeneutic fundamental ontology.

This leads to the main research areas of lifeworld and system, modernization theory, analytic action, and language and interpretation theory. The aim of the project and the associated journal was to lay the foundations of the social sciences in terms of language theory, which already indicates the close connection to related disciplines such as philosophy, social sciences and linguistics, as well as to a sociological systems theory. The project is thus linked to a Frankfurt tradition represented by Jürgen Habermas and his Theory of Communcative Action, insofar as it is a fundamentally oriented combination of philosophical with social and socio-theoretical problems. From a philosophical perspective,

an analytical theory of interpretation and action and from a sociological perspective a further-reaching systems theory approach form the core. With this ambitious and comprehensive conception, the Theory of Communicative Action was the last of the grand theories to fail. The combination of a sociological theory of society and a theory of action based on analytical speech theory was confronted with some major structural problems (Preyer 2000).

For ProtoSociology – journal and project – this meant that we lost our programmatics, but not our focus. Two of Gerhard Preyer's favorite dictums are the Chinese "follow the change" and "you have to reinvent yourself". But they have to be realized equally: not only in documenting change, but also in constituting it. Thus, all the projects that were initiated and carried out – the book publications and the journal – became a process rather than a momentary snapshot of the state of the art. The controlled project process itself also has a discursive form, which can be explained both by the development of the underlying problem through the work and by the communication between the participants. The works received influence the progress and conceptualization of the project as a work in progress. They reveal new issues and point to follow-on problems that may be addressed by new contributors, or may initiate a new project. On the other hand, authors are also in contact with each other through the journal and can build on previous collaborations, etc. ProtoSociology is thus a medium of communication, not only through the finished journal, but also through the special kind of project work on which it is based. Instead of simply inviting papers on a particular topic, we conceptualize and formulate a scientific problem within and during the project, to which leading scholars in the field are invited to contribute.

This also explains why Gerhard Preyer has such a strong publication record in the social sciences and philosophy. He simply followed the change, which is also a result of his own work. But if we look more closely, it still seems that the philosophical part has more often a sociological impact than vice versa.

Philosophy within and close by of sociology

In the early 1980s, in collaboration with Michael Roth (Preyer and Roth 1989), a first version of the problem situation of analytic philosophy was drafted, which was later elaborated and somewhat modified. This was preceded by the treatment of the problem situation of the analytic theory of action, which reached its zenith in German philosophy in the 1970s. Rüdiger Bubner, Jürgen

Habermas, and Herbert Schnädelbach gave lectures on this topic. Analytical action theory was relevant to the project because the notion of logical form is a link between it, action theory, linguistic theory, sociological theory, and ontology. This is especially worth mentioning because analytic action theory has not been adequately treated by sociologists working in the segment of sociological action theory. It was the connecting element between the sociological and the philosophical aspects of Preyer's project. But from the very beginning there was a deep and broad philosophical reconstruction of these discussions. It was not limited by any sociological programmatic, making it a vehicle for the completion of a social theory. Remarkably, pragmatics and speech act theory seemed at the time to be a kind of magic bullet for all sorts of problems in the humanities, even in literary studies.

The best example of this is Donald Davidson. Starting in the late 1980s, Gerhard Preyer was one of the first philosophers to study Donald Davidson's philosophy in Germany. With several book publications from 1997 to 2011, it has also been a focus of his work, leading him from speech act theory and contextualism (Preyer and Peter 2005, 2007) to the philosophical mind. A retrospective on Jean Paul Sartre in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind (Preyer and Miguens 2016) is the latest step. Calling it a sideline should not detract from the importance and continuity of this philosophical part, but there are two aspects that will lead to a better picture.

In book publications or in the journal, the focus has always been on philosophers doing the work of a sociologist. This close relationship was not justified by theoretical concerns. ProtoSociology did what its name says: it analyzed the basic terms of a theory using the idea of transdisciplinarity, where sociological topics are examined from a different angle.

For example, problems of understanding others, i.e. interpreting the feelings and beliefs of others, may be discussed not by psychologists or sociologists, but by philosophers. Two of our volumes are examples of this. In the first case, Folk Psychology, Mental Concepts, and the Ascription of Attitudes, the basic conditions under which one ascribes certain feelings and attitudes to someone in everyday language were discussed. The other volume, Understanding the Social: New Perspectives from Epistemology, dealt with the question of the extent to which one can ascribe common beliefs to a group, and whether it can be understood only as a collection of individuals. of individuals, or whether, following Hegel, the whole of the group is more than the sum of its parts or members. In this way, fundamental problems of psychology are also addressed from a "foreign" perspective.

Closely related are the publications on cognitive semantics and social on-

tology. Methodologically, social ontology poses the question: Do we need to introduce new ontological categories to describe social reality, or can our social reality be described with the familiar (but no less controversial) categories? Can social properties have a causal effect? Can the laws of social reality (if they exist) be traced back to the laws of individual psychology?

One of the most important questions in the social sciences concerns the relationship between the individual and groups or society as a whole. Together with Raimo Tuomela and later Margaret Gilbert, Gerhard Preyer has realized several projects that give a philosophical perspective to this sociological problem.

Raimo Tuomela's Social Ontology discusses a variety of related topics concerning situations where people actually form a group and share collectively intentional states that depend on the group's main goals, interests, values, beliefs, and norms etc, as well as act together as group members.

Tuomela developed a "collective acceptance view of sociality" using the distinction between "I-mode" and "we-mode" notions and states. The extended account expands the scope of this framework by adding the notion of "external authorities" that control social groups. Similarly, its central notion of the we-mode is analogously extended to the case of power. One of the main goals of the Collective Acceptance View of Sociality is to analyze the conceptual resources and theorizing of the social domain from both the individual and collective points of view, and this includes an account of the "shared point of view". Some topics new to the literature on social ontology and collective intentionality are analyzed. These include group solidarity, group reasons and we-reasoning, and institutionality based on collective construction. Tuomela's social ontology also provides conceptual tools for the study of various intergroup phenomena, including both cooperation and conflict in international relations.

The research continued in collaboration with Margaret Gilbert. At the time, social ontology was a relatively new scientific field of interdisciplinary research and conceptualization. Social ontology is located between theoretical and practical philosophy:

> Analysans of theoretical thinking are assertive illocutionary acts which have as analysanda constative sentences and their epistemic foundation of theoretical reasoning; analysans of practical thinking are action sentences, practical inferences and their validity which have as analysanda descriptions of actions and properties of action tokens. Both have their own ontological commitments such as of cognition, actions and their components.(ProtoSociology 2018, 7)

The ontology of the social domain includes a wide range of topics such as social agency, collective intentionality, social exchange, social groups, formal

organizations (cooperations), and the differentiation of subsystems of actions and communication within framework of the societal division of labor.

Multiple modernities and their memberships

The other part of Preyer's scientific work, the sociological one, has a philosophical impact on basic sociological problems. One example is Karl Jaspers' concept of axial time: In contrast to a linear, one-dimensional teleological model of human evolution, as constructed by Hegel and copied by Marx, human evolution is based on simultaneous but not identical processes. This led to a completely different understanding of globalization in the late 1990s.

"Globalization is not a homogenization of all social life on earth. It is a heterogeneous process that connects the global and the local on different levels. Furthermore, globalization is more often used as a catchall argument to pursue political goals than for sound scientific analysis." (Preyer and Bös 2001, 4)

This idea of multiple modernities in sociology is linked to Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. Starting in the early 2000s with ProtoSociology volume 15, Preyer began to revisit (Preyer 2011), reconstruct, and expand (Preyer and Sussmann 2016) Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities and his research program. Together with Eisenstadt himself, Roland Robertson, Barrie Axford, and others, several articles, projects, and book publications have been realized.

A one-dimensional concept of modernity has a central perspective that leads to "Eurocentrism," and the question of more or less modernity tends to be a question of right and wrong. For example, development aid in Africa has been an almost total failure for decades, costing billions. Exporting Western democracy and economics does not work. A universal idea of the one and only modernity may believe in its historical necessity, but is unable to understand the dynamics of the global and the local – glocalization – within the process of globalization. States like Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and perhaps even Vietnam, on the other hand, are very stable communities and well integrated into the process of globalization. But are they "modern" societies, and by what definition?

"Japan is not a Western democracy; it only pretends to look like one. This rather exaggerated joke by Gerhard Preyer is of course not an insult, but a consequence of the concept of multiple modernities. What are Japan and China, then, if not copies of Western democracies (which are not homogeneous either)? What concepts and terminology do we need for a proper understanding?

While most of Preyer's work is (meta-)theoretical, Japan and more often China are his "empirical" subjects for the concept of multiple modernities.

In volume 32 of ProtoSociology, Making and Unmaking modern Japan, modernity is described as a specific non-linear process, while the contributors "share the dual conviction that (1) understanding the lineaments of Japanese modernity entails an appreciation of the specific forms of distinctions, discriminations and exclusions constitutive of it; (2) that the socio-economic-political fractures increasingly visible under conditions of late modernity reveal the precarious nature of the making of modernity in Japan." (Vij 2015, 5)

But China took up much more space, resulting in several volumes and book publications, as well as extensive collaboration with Chinese colleagues, so that two of Preyer's articles and ProtoSociology vol. 31 were translated into Chinese.

In his view, a new sociology was needed to understand and describe this new kind of modernization, especially in China. According to him, it is "the ability of the Communist Party of China to preserve the social order of Chinese society. From a sociological point of view, this meant maintaining the membership order of the Chinese society." (Preyer and Krausse 2023, 153) This may sound trivial because it is an acknowledged goal of the Communist Party, but it is not, because it works and needs to be understood. And the keyword "membership order" brings us to the final center of his work, the Sociology of Membership.

In a sense, one could say that ProtoSociology is Gerhard Preyer, but not the other way around. His scholarly work goes beyond the topics of the journal, especially his conception of a social theory of membership, published in three volumes by Springer (Preyer 2006, 2006a, 2008)1. "The analysis of the sociology of membership as a new research program integrates the insights on contemporary societies of the international research group focused on multiple modernities since the 2000s." (Preyer and Krausse, 2023, ix)

Or to keep it programmatic: The sociology of membership is a research program as a contribution to sociological theory. It defines sociology as a membership system and a membership order. In this respect, it does not proceed in an ideal-typical manner. At the current state, it is not yet conceived whether it finds (establishes) general social laws (membership laws) and transfers them into an axiomatic theory construction.

Membership sociology distinguishes between membership theory and membership sociology in a narrower sense, i.e. a specification of the general frame of reference of membership theory on differentiation and interpenetration of the social system as a membership system (order). The research program aims

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1   The second edition (Preyer 2018a, b, c) of the three books has been so thoroughly revised and expanded that it is now more than twice the size of the first edition.

to define each social (communication) event within the general frame of reference of membership theory.

Membership theory and membership sociology provide a particular response to the conceptualization (framing) of the internal and external differentiation of social systems as membership systems. It assumes that the consciousness and mental constitution of psycho-physical, neuronal entities has only a very limited scope for processing the complexity and continence of social systems (Luhmann, Gehlen). In this respect, the framing is not based on the concept of meaning (Luhmann).

The general frame of reference (membership theory) distinguishes between the following components:

External stabilization:
  – Membership decision as a time difference, time dimension (time consciousness), memory
Internal differentiation:
  – Scope for negation: immunization and conflict
  – Authority system
  – Collective identity
  – Primary and secondary social systems (membership systems)

Basic assumptions as a general reference problem are:

Not only sociology, but also philosophy should be aware that the research program of membership sociology is the reference problem of selective processing of reduced complexity. This would be a variation of a convergence theory (Parsons, Luhmann, W. Ross Ashby). There are further convergences, one of which is that the members of social systems must be able to refer to themselves and to others. However, this requires a special analysis.

It should be emphasized that, from the perspective of membership theory, the attribution instance is not spatio-temporally-biographically individuated individuals (as particulars). This points to the interpenetration between members of social systems and consciousness as their environment.

Gerhard Preyer as an academic teacher, colleague, and friend for almost forty years – more or less – had a special kind of influence on the editors. Especially as a young ambitious academic it is like in soccer, where you miss most of the fun if you are not supporter of one of the teams, Marxism, Relativism, Pragmatism or whatever. But after a while it seems that partisanship comes at a price, especially in Frankfurt.

To illustrate it and put it crudely, Adorno only taught us why Popper or positivism should be rejected from his point of view. A reconstruction of the positions from their own logic, at least with the attempt to work out the existing strengths, did not take place. You did not really learn anything substantial about Popper. And even Jürgen Habermas has a very own and creative way to deal with different thinkers and putting them into perspective, even if this is – in his case – a strong point.

But one of Gerhard Preyer's strengths, however, is precisely this: the reconstruction of complex arguments in their respective contexts. This is no mere philological-hermeneutic neutrality, because a certain orientation towards defined problems and perspectives are always a guiding principle. It is a special form of academic professionalism that distinguishes him. The position between orthodoxy and arbitrariness is not a fixed point, but a meandering path. It shows respect for different positions and for the other in principle, which is also the key to new and long-lasting collaborations or even friendships.

Based on some of his statements, this may also have biographical reasons, stemming from the German student movement of the late 1960s, when having the right perspective was too often a question of having the right attitude; and attitude is always related to the staging of power interests. He does not have to share a good argument in order to respect and sometimes even support it. This has not only had a great influence on our self-understanding as scientists, but it also characterizes our friendship with Gerhard Preyer.

We, the editors, would like to thank all the contributors, which is a common and almost trivial gesture. But here it is more, because the project ProtoSociology and the scholarly work of Gerhard Preyer owe their existence and success to the collegial cooperation and the developing discourse over decades. This kind of – sometimes long-term – relationship cannot be realized within a large publishing house, but here.

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Two Decades of Friendship and Philosophy: Navigating Mind's Complexities with Professor Gerhard Preyer

Anita Pacholik-Żuromska

Abstract

The presented contribution has both a personal and somewhat scientific tone. It provides a brief overview of the twenty years of collaboration with Professor Preyer, emphasizing key discussion points that have been integral to this long-standing exchange.

It began a long time ago. I needed to refresh my memory to recall how the meetings, debates, discussions and workshops, which professor Gerhard Preyer and me made during all these years of the cooperation, started. It is impossible to remember everything, but there were some milestones, which influenced my philosophical development, and for which I am deeply thankful.

I met professor Gerhard Preyer in 2003 when I was on a scholarship at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz. My supervisor from the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, professor Urszula Żegleń advised me to make an appointment with professor Preyer, with whom she already had a successful academic exchange. I called prof. Preyer and introduced myself. Professor did not sound surprised and proposed a meeting in Frankfurt on Main (a half hour of train trip from Mainz) at Bockenheimer Warte.

So I came to Frankfurt, found the place (at this day was a food market there). It was direct in front of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University where Social Sciences were located (today they are at Campus Westend). I looked around and after few minutes I recognized professor Preyer. I do not remember anymore, whether he was on a bike, but he used to ride a bike a lot, so it is very probable. We exchanged pleasantries, went to a coffee shop and started to talk. And so it began. Since this time we regularly meet online, and if there is an opportunity also in person.

The first idea I received from prof. Preyer was the preparation of the collected papers translated from German into Polish presenting a variety of approaches to the problem of mind: "German analytic philosophy of mind" (Pacholik-Żuromska 2011). I invited the leading philosophers from Germany and polish translators. After few years the book was published. During the preparation of the book I came to Frankfurt in the frame of DAAD Scholarship to work

What's Under Sex?

Ernie Lepore

Many philosophers – analytic or otherwise – at least since the sexual revolutions of the late 1960s have been attempting to analyze the concept of sex and other concepts in its family (perverse, complete and normal sex, etc.). Stiff issues arise in clarifying just what all is supposed to be involved in attempting to analyze a concept. Most authors agree that whatever it involves, it does not follow that a correct analysis requires the concept carrier to be – what? – consciously, explicitly, or "fully" aware of it. So, for example, Nagel (1969), in what must be the mother of all pieces written on sexual perversion (at least, among contemporary analytic philosophers) teases us with an account of the concept of complete sex where no sexual act is complete unless its participants recognize themselves as having reciprocal beliefs, desires, and intentions about each other. This account, no matter how hard one might try, resists simplification; some critics reject it just because it is so complex. Moulton (1975), for example, declares that if Nagel's concept of sex were our own, sex would be much too distracting. Her reaction misses the point of conceptual analysis, I fear; even when one indulges in the philosophy of sex dull issues like the paradox of analysis can arise.

What may be a little less controversial among philosophers is that, though an analysis may generate no obvious psychological or epistemological consequences, it may still spawn metaphysical consequences. If our concept of sex requires that an activity A is sexual just in case A has property P, then no activity could be sexual unless it embodies P. This renders P a part of the very nature of sex.

Of course, even this metaphysical claim isn't entirely uncontroversial. There are philosophers who do not think our concept of something necessarily reveals its nature. One way of taking in Putnam's (1975) Twin-Earth thought is that although being wet, being the stuff that quenches our thirst, that cools us down, that fills our lakes, oceans, rivers, etc., may contribute to our concept of water, these are not part of its nature. How one thinks these

thought experiments extend to (the concept of) sex will be partly determined by whether one think that what underlies sex is a nature, and not a convention.

Many philosophers who write about sex defend their analyses entirely by an appeal to common sense. To the extent that this is the only way to proceed, there can be little room for divergence between our concept of sex and its

Consequences of Forgetting Austin (Conceptions of Context and Varieties of Contextualism)

Sofia Miguens

Abstract

Although it was in his work that several important ideas regarding contextualism originated, J. L. Austin is a classic of the history of analytical philosophy often absent in recent discussions. My intention in this article is to identify some (bad) consequences of forgetting Austin when one is a self-professed contextualist. One further goal is to examine the conceptions of context being used within different varieties of contextualism. In A Plea for Excuses Austin claimed, "When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or "meanings", whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use words to talk about". In this article I will look at the way Michael Williams (Williams 2019) follows this lead in criticizing another epistemologist, Duncan Pritchard (Pritchard 2016).

It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this *Festschrift* for Gerhard Preyer. Although I feel I have known Gerhard for a very long time, we made contact only around 2005, through our common American friend, Rutgers philosopher Ernest Lepore. Since then, I have been amazed (as, I imagine, all of Gerhard's friends, colleagues, and students have) with his non-stop work, and the sheer number of projects he always had in progress. We have edited together two volumes, *Consciousness and Subjectivity* (Ontos Verlag, now De Gruyter, 2012) and *Pre-Reflective Consciousness – Sartre and contemporary debates in philosophy of mind* (Routledge 2015). In both cases we aimed for a dialogue between analytic philosophy and the Continental tradition – this is a cause still very dear to me. Throughout the years, Gerhard came to Porto to give lectures and always showed great interest in talking to students and sharing research experiences. He also called my attention to the richness of contemporary German philosophy beyond Heidegger's shadow. This included the works of Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank, as well as the intersections between work on consciousness and self-consciousness within German philosophy and 20th century French philosophy. Gerhard was always interested as well, of course, in analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind and language, which is my own main field of work. Gerhard has contributed to discussions of contextualism with two Oxford University Press volumes, edited with Georg Peter (Preyer and Peter

Communication and Conceptual Change: The Engineering Problem

Peter Pagin

Abstract

This paper concerns the problem for conceptual engineering of changing the subject. I emphasize the parallels between the continuity of inquiry, the truth-conditions of attitude reports, and the conditions of communicative success. After that, I consider in more detail the proposed solution to this problem by Herman Cappelen. I argue against it, by appeal to the communication considerations. The paper concludes with some methodological comments.

1. Conceptual engineering and the change of subject threat

Conceptual Engineering (CE) has been characterized as

> […] the process of assessing and improving our representational devices (Cappelen 2018, p. 3)

Other terms that have been used with similar meaning are "conceptual" followed by "ethics", or "revision", or "amelioration" (see Cappelen and Plunkett 2020, p. 2).

Among these four terms, three strongly indicate a process of change in terms of representational or conceptual content, and that is what will interest me in this paper. That is, I will be interested in the difference across time between a prior, pre-modified or pre-engineered state, and the posterior, post-engineered state.

What motivates work in this area of philosophy is the desire to replace a concept that is perceived as *flawed* in some respect with a concept that is *improved* in that same respect. The flaw may be of a social/political nature, or a logical nature, or a metaphysical nature, or yet something else. And the new or updated concept will be seen as improved, and will perhaps also in some cases *be* improved. This aspect will, however, not be of primary interest here. I will be interested in the difference itself, irrespective of the merits and flaws of concepts involved.

It has long been an object of concern in this area that changing a concept brings with it the risk of *changing of the subject* (or *topic*). Changing the subject means, roughly, that instead of talking about the *same* subject matter (in an improved way) after the revision, the effect of the revision is that the user of the new (improved) concept ends

Phenomenal Intentionality and Intentionality Holism

Terry Horgan and John Tienson

Abstract

A number of philosophers, ourselves included, advocate the Phenomenal Intentionality thesis, which asserts that the fundamental kind of intentionality or aboutness is the intentionality of occurrent conscious states or processes. We take this to imply that phenomenal intentionality is both intrinsic and basic. We ourselves also maintain that phenomenal intentionality of the kind instantiated in humans can only occur within the context of a wider cognitive system with the capacity to undergo a whole range of distinct phenomenal/ intentional states/processes. There is a prima facie tension here. How can the phenomenal intentionality of a currently occurrent conscious state/process be intrinsic to that state/process itself if its having that specific content depends constitutively on the cognitive system's capacity to undergo a wider range of other, not-currently-occurrent, conscious phenomenal states/ processes? Addressing this conundrum, which we will call the intrinsicness/holism dilemma, is our project here.

1. Phenomenal intentionality and the intrinsicness-holism dilemma

A number of philosophers, ourselves included, advocate the *Phenomenal Intentionality* thesis (for short, PI), which asserts that the fundamental kind of intentionality or aboutness is the intentionality of occurrent conscious states or processes. We take this to imply that phenomenal intentionality is both intrinsic and basic:

Intrinsic:
　　　　Since consciousness is intrinsic to the conscious state/process itself, phenomenal intentionality is intrinsic to the conscious state/process, and therefore is narrow.

Basic:
　　　　All other states/processes properly called intentional derive their intentionality, at least in part, from phenomenal intentionality. This includes the intentionality of language, the intentionality of not-presently-occurrent memories, beliefs, desires, plans, and so forth.

In What Sense is Physicalism a Materialism?

Yi Jiang

Abstract

Most modern philosophers, including Gerhard Preyer, believe that physicalism is the same as materialism, whether they defend it or not. However, few people are aware of the subtle differences between them. In this article, I will first clarify the historical distinction between materialism and physicalism by explaining three distinct senses of materialism in historical and modern contexts, especially in the empiricist tradition. Second, I will focus on the differences between the three forms of materialism in the philosophy of mind. Based on the above analysis, physicalism cannot be interpreted as materialism. Finally, I will summarize the intrinsic relationship between physicalism and materialism by defining materialism from the perspective of the ontology of physical objects.

It is generally accepted that physicalism is the same concept as materialism, especially in the philosophy of mind, since the two terms are acknowledged interchangeably in explaining the nature of the mind. However, few people observe the nuances between them, and only by recognizing these differences can we see that physicalism is historically and theoretically distinct from materialism. In this article, I will argue that these two terms represent distinct philosophical positions and that there is little acceptable room for interchangeability between the two terms in a historical context. To do this, I will first explore three types of materialism in a historical context to show that physicalism in the philosophy of mind differs from materialism in the metaphysical sense. I will then explain the gaps in the various interpretations of the identity between physicalism and materialism. Finally, I will explain that physicalism can only be seen as materialism justifiable in one sense.

I. Three types of materialism in a historical context

Historically, materialism has had at least three meanings in the philosophical tradition, regardless of what it means in other fields, such as economics or psychology. These are naïve, mechanical, and dialectical materialism, each demonstrating its fundamental difference from physicalism.

First, naïve materialism, known as "direct realism" in the philosophy of per-

In Defense of Relational Self-Acquaintance: A Reply to Anita Pacholik and Gerhard Preyer

Kenneth Williford

…[I]n the case of self-cognizing consciousness, although there is no separation between the knower, the known, and the act of knowing, from the very moment that consciousness is itself present, it is not hidden from itself. Its experience occurs to itself in the nature of clarity and knowing. And this is what is called the "self-knowing mind." It exists within the sphere of worldly, everyday convention; and it is on this level that one must determine whether one's consciousness actually knows itself or not. If one decides that it does not know itself (on this level), one has no other option but to say that one's mind is hidden from itself.

Jamgön Mipham, *The Light of the Day Star*[1]

Abstract

Anita Pacholik and Gerhard Preyer have recently criticized the view, defended by myself and others, that consciousness bears a direct acquaintance relation to itself. Their position that such a self-relation is impossible is in line with views defended by Manfred Frank, Dieter Henrich, and Dan Zahavi. In this contribution, I mount a defense of the self-acquaintance theory of pre-reflective self-consciousness against their criticisms. Among other things, I argue that reflexive relations (or reflexive instances of relations) are perfectly ontologically respectable in general, show (once again) that the self-acquaintance theory does not lead to an infinite regress, and articulate the major concession to the Heidelberg School's position on this matter that I have made that Preyer, Pacholik, Frank and Zahavi should be happy with – namely, that the self-acquaintance of consciousness is a matter of an essential, intrinsic property of consciousness and not a matter of it bearing an external or otherwise mediated relation to itself.

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[1]　In Mipham 2017, 285. Jamgön Ju Mipham Gyatso (1846–1912), a major scholar in the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism and important figure in the ecumenical (*Rimé*) movement, wrote some of the best defenses of pre-reflective self-consciousness (Skt. *svasamvedana*; Tib. *rang rig*) in the Buddhist tradition (esp. against its rejection by Je Tsong Khapa (c.1357-c.1419), who made denial of even the conventional existence of *rang rig* integral to his conception of Prāsangika Madhyamaka (see Tsong Khapa 2021, ch. 14), and his later followers in the Geluk school, the school Tsong Khapa helped establish). On many points, Mipham anticipates contemporary defenses of pre-reflective self-consciousness. See, esp., Williams 1998 and Garfield 2006 for criticism. *The Light of the Daystar: Answers to Objections* was written in 1889.

Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: An Essay Inspired by Ideas of the "Heidelberg School"

Holger Gutschmidt

Abstract

The following is a contribution to the understanding of human subjectivity. Its starting point are the results of various approaches of the last decades, which show that self-consciousness cannot be understood by the usual epistemic and semantic means of explanation. Drawing on a proposal by the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch and on some insights of the Heidelberg School, a reconstruction is therefore offered here that explains both the structure of self-consciousness and its genesis. At the center of these considerations is the so-called "pre-reflective consciousness", which was first discussed in depth by Jean-Paul Sartre. It is shown that the pre-reflective consciousness and the self-knowledge of the person do not form a tension-free unity, from which fact further conclusions can be drawn that have received little attention so far.

1. Introduction

In the treatment of the topic of self-consciousness by 20th century philosophy, at least three approaches can be distinguished: a) the phenomenological, which was particularly influential in the first half of the last century and which has returned to the discussion in recent years; b) the semantic, which was long favoured by analytic philosophy; c) and the transcendental, which basically goes back to the late 18th century (Immanuel Kant and his successors, especially Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Johann Gottlieb Fichte), and was revived in the form of the Heidelberg School by Dieter Henrich. While the phenomenological approach will always remain valuable because self-consciousness is only accessible through the privileged standpoint of the first person, the semantic approach has shown above all that the phenomenon cannot be explained solely intersubjectively and through linguistic knowledge of rules. The questions posed by the transcendental approach went even further than understanding how self-consciousness is experienced and how we can define it. Originally (especially in Kant and his successors), it was about the "I (-think)". Kant associated a functional meaning with this: the "I"-consciousness has a decisive ("synthetic") task in the formation of all judgements. For Kant's successors, however, this soon became a comprehensive task in terms of a theory of justification: the "I"

On Legal Boundaries

Athanasios Gromitsaris

Absract

The paper addresses six primary forms of delimitation in and through the law, each with its his-tory: Absence, disappointment, membership, work, words, and exigence. Depicting absence (pars pro toto, identities, sites of desire, backgrounds) is something we need to understand in order to accept the conditions of the present order every time. Dealing with disappointments is behind equality and security, forum shopping, conflict avoidance, and conflict propagation. Memberships enable questions about autonomy grades, professionalization, and scientificization that are transverse to kinship, prestige, center-periphery, and functional differentiation. The role of words (e.g., lexical stability/conceptual renewal, fair dispensation/corrupt connivance) is eas-ier to recognize if you look at the legal systems from the perspective of the conquerors, the con-quered, the travelers, and the displaced. Work, seen from the angle of what it brings to the evo-lution of the relationship between social communication and individual consciousness (confir-mation/transformation, synchronicity/disconnection, digital/analog), prompts the law to redraw the spheres of responsibility. Exigence reflects law´s rhetoricity. It is a problem created by and for different audiences, inviting challenges to what is established as relevant to the law. Exam-ples illustrate how the six terms help to avoid examining pre-modern law through the construc-tions of modernist theorists and how they allow for competing approaches to legal relevance.

Absence

To understand law, we unintentionally put more emphasis on "pathology", "deviation", "conflict", because "it is easier to explain the presence of something than its absence" (Ross 1993, 35). However, one cannot avoid dealing with absence in law. Representation, legitimacy, order, state, constitution, or realms of unrealized possibilities all involve "making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact" (Pitkin 1967, 8), (Mansbridge 2003).

What is made present can belong to the past, the future, a deeper or transcendental order, be physically distant, function as a model, represent a special or rare quality or a community. Legitimacy is an improbable equation, because it is the result of managing divergent aspirations to identify and make relevant various absences. In the past it embodied success in "reconciling dynasty and usurpation, heredity and merit, kingship and adoption, blood and unction" (Dagron 2003, 48). There are competing "markers of legitimacy", for ex., dy-

What Can We Know?[1] Or: Philosophizing Without a Philosophy

Wilhelm K. Essler

dedicated to my friend and companion
Gerhard Preyer

Abstract
Whatever the area and scope of what is theoretically possible to recognize and therefore to know is possible for us, to recognize this and thereby knowing it: thus exploring the limits of what is possible for us to know, this is the subject of any serious philosophizing.
The subject of this short paper is what can be achieved in individual steps while avoiding pointless rambling, which is presented here only in brief pointers.

Whatever the area and scope of what is theoretically possible to *recognize* and therefore to *know* is possible for us, *to recognize this* and thereby *knowing* it: thus exploring the limits of what is possible for *us* to know[2], *this* is the subject of any serious philosophizing.

And with that, I have already said and summarized everything that needs to be said in general. Everything else consists of clarifications and embellishments of these clarifications.

Expressions such as "recognize" and "know" indicate genuinely pragmatic concepts. And so it is appropriate to provide some preliminary notes on my

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1 According to Kant, the question "What can we know?" indicates one of the three fundamental questions of any serious philosophizing.

2 This relativization to "us" can be found already in Kant in a side remark – obviously overlooked by the interpreters I am familiar with – in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "for us humans, at least". They either did not notice this relativization of Kant´s theoretical philosophy carried out by Kant himself, or at least did not recognize its fundamental importance.
Note: We do not yet have access to the languages of the different groups of dolphins, based on our human language. However, dolphins quite obviously understand at least those parts of a trainer's language with which the trainer forces them to carry out contortions that are unfamiliar to them, but are effective for the audience.
The same applies to elephants, although they themselves communicate using ultrasound. When it comes to African elephants, however, we have already made a step forward in identifying their languages. We now know e.g. that they use the same acoustic expression for "human" and "dangerous enemy"; and this should actually give us humans something to think about.

Global Studies: The Changing Face of a Proto-Paradigm in the 21st Century

Barrie Axford

Abstract

At a time of heated debate on the future of humanity and the resilience of Earth system processes – atmospheric, geological, hydrological, biospheric, and on the planetary and extra-planetary implications of such a loss of resilience – it seems appropriate to interrogate the field of global studies over its scope and ambition when addressing global processes, forms and consciousness. This article is a contribution to the science of globalization, as scholarship tries to keep pace with seemingly runaway trends and daunting circumstances, yet still give due attention to the humdrum and incremental as staples of world-making practice. Contemplating the global requires authors to "unthink", or at least recalibrate, social science in much the same spirit – though from a more varied perspective – as Immanuel Wallerstein counselled some three decades ago (1991). In such a milieu there are many questions for scholarship, including do the same rules of knowledge creation apply regardless of disruption or continuity? Are we talking about phenomena that share the same characteristics regardless of time and space? Is there variability across different periods of "globalness", with any answer dependent upon which global formation is being referenced? In sum, is globalization always, and obviously, globalization, or do we need new ways to comprehend rapidly changing global complexity and cosmic uncertainties?

Introduction: What's at stake?

This essay is sits squarely in the vital, though still inchoate, field of global studies. At a time of intense debate on the future of humanity and the resilience of earth- system processes – atmospheric, geological, hydrological, biospheric – and on the planetary and extra-planetary implications of any loss of resilience, it adverts the field's scope and ambition when addressing global processes, forms and consciousness. It is an address to the global modern, and to variants of and possible alternatives to that condition, and thus a contribution to the science of globalization, as scholarship tries to keep pace with daunting trends trends and circumstances, yet still give due attention to the humdrum and incremental as staples of world-making practice (Benedikter and Kofler, 2020). The article draws on work I have reported in the pages of this journal over two decades and is also beholden to research being conducted and reported in parallel on the changing character of the global modern (Axford, 2016; Axford and Huggins, 2025; Axford, 2021, 2022). In so doing, I attempt a modest delivery on Wallerstein's injunction, made some

When Multiple Modernities and Globalization Processes Cross

Judit Bokser Liwerant

A Homage to Gerhard Preyer

Gerhard Preyer's sociology is significantly related to the growing relevance of the conceptualization of Multiple Modernities and the changing dynamics of globalization processes. Both dimensions have shaped the Third Research Program Multiple Modernities, Belonging, and Globalization (2015), which recovers, reinterprets, and heightens S.N. Eisenstadt's work and expands and renews Preyer's contribution. In this homage, I will examine selected theoretical achievements and conceptual challenges that Preyer's work and elaborations on Eisenstadt pose from the perspective of Latin America.

The Americas were the first case of Multiple Modernities. They have historically been globally constituted and incorporated into the world configuration by an extension of the European experience. Nevertheless, the latter became not just "fragments of Europe" (Hartz, 1969) or replicas of each other but civilizations and societies in their own right, and thus the earliest case of Multiple Modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000). Latin America followed distinctive institutional patterns and cultural projects to enter or create Modernity, challenging a view of globalization processes as uniform and unchanging and the "homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions" of the Western program of Modernity. While retaining a global scope, it emphasizes the contradictory, contingent, and even antinomian nature of Modernity and Modernization – an understanding of its complexity shared by Gerard Preyer.

This valuable contribution to understanding and explaining Latin America implies important meta-theoretical assumptions as well, which fuel an integrative and critical perspective on the region's "peripheral" condition while acknowledging diversity and heterogeneity as intrinsic values of social life. Indeed, Multiple Modernities challenge the notion of a singular path to Modernity, arguing that different societies experience modernization uniquely based on their historical and cultural contexts (Eisenstadt 2000, 2002a, 2013; Preyer 2013, 2016b). This approach combines a general sociological perspective with historical structural preconditions, focusing on the relationship between "agency and structure" and "cultural and social structure" as a framework for analysis (clues to the control of the flow of free resources). Thus, it makes it possible to identify and systematize the similarities and differences between the

Multiple Modernities: An Interpretation

Yitzhak Sternberg

Abstract

A major merit of the multiple modernities approach is its ability to incorporate within its framework new phenomena as well as phenomena from the past. Thus, the approach has a very strong potential to extend its explanatory power and relevance. This merit of the approach is exemplified, in the article, by suggesting several such extensions. Thus, it is argued that certain contemporary populist movements share some similarities with Jacobin modern movements. It is suggested that the approach's discussions on factors explaining differences between varieties of modernity can be enriched by the debates about a German Sonderweg as well as by discussions concerning differences between modern settler societies. It can be argued that major differences between modern settler societies, between varieties of modernity, can be explained by differences in the local conditions and challenges confronting the settlers in their place of settlement.

Introduction

The multiple modernities approach was introduced by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. This approach, like some other theories in the social sciences, has both merits and shortcomings. In this article I am focusing mainly on its theoretical, existing and potential, contributions. This article attempts to contribute to the understanding of this approach, to highlight certain of its existing merits as well as to point at some potential theoretical contributions that can emanate from suggested possible extensions of the approach.

The contribution to the understanding of the multiple modernities approach is done by suggesting the three following major factors as explaining main differences between varieties of modernity: major tensions within modernity; combinations between modernity and distinct historical experiences and traditions; and local conditions confronting and challenging settlers.

Another contribution to apprehending the approach is made by confronting it with some relevant alternative theories while pointing at the differences between them as well as the approach's criticism of the alternatives. This confrontation and comparison enables to understand the uniqueness of the multiple modernities approach and its contributions. The alternative theories include the *capitalist society* and the *industrial society* approaches; the *classical modernization theory*; the *end of modernity* or the *postmodern society* approach;

A Sociological Research Program for Linguistic Landscapes

Eliezer Ben-Rafael

Abstract

This essay discusses topics pertaining to a sociological research program of linguistic landscapes (LL in the all-following)). We see in linguistic landscapes a major area of symbolization of contemporary urban societies. Unlike the interest shown by sociolinguistic students, until these days, this field has attracted but a few sociologists. We are particularly interested in those spaces that are designated as urban centers, that is, the streets and squares where LLs is of emblematic impacts. We propose to investigate these spaces on the basis of a distinction of three facets (1) tenets of individual LL items regarding their language choices; (2) directives transpiring on items exercised by top-down public-regulative factors versus effects of bottom-up influences targeting potential clients; (3) impacts of present-day waves of globalization displacing populations and goods from one end of the globe to the other. The sociological investigation of these different – but interlinked – sequences challenges the capture of the currents underlying LLs' transformations. An investigation that aims at deciphering the order within and beneath the apparent disorder of LLs.

A topic of study

 This essay outlines a sociological research program for the study of linguistic landscapes (LL) which we see as major means of symbolization of central spaces of contemporary urban settings. We draw our notion of research program from Preyer's discussion (2013) of Eisenstadt's elaboration of multiple modernities (2004/2; 2013). Eisenstadt, to remember, assumed that the term multiple modernity stands for a view of today's world consisting of a multiplication of societal models all responding to a basic common understanding of what modernity stands for. He associated this view with individualistic culture, urbanization and technological progress. This approach is elaborated further, and in a variety of directions, by Preyer who presents research issues arising under the notion which Eisenstadt labelled as *multiple modernities*.

Linguistic landscapes, we contend, deserves elaboration from that perspective. We view in recent decades a growing number of researchers who converge toward this area – anthropologists, social linguists, semioticians or applied linguists. Though, only a restricted number is involved here from a sociological standpoint despite its potential important contribution to the study of that

Why the Normative of Human Rights is Still Contested in the Twenty-First Century

Luis Roniger

Abstract

This article honoring Gerhard Preyer addresses the debates and sources of resistance to the normative of human rights despite its seemingly global and legal anchoring. It tackles the riddle of why such normative is still contested and attacked on multiple fronts in the 21ˢᵗ century.

I start from the basics, by defining human rights and reviewing some of the historical landmarks and different analytical viewpoints that have been suggested on their development; and examine problems and debates on the anchoring of their universality. I then suggest how the hindsight of several analytical perspectives, primarily those of multiple modernities and glocalization, may contribute understanding on the persisting challenges that a normative of human rights faces worldwide. I plan to turn this text into the opening chapter of a book on the politics of human rights.

Defining human rights

The first task is to elucidate how to define human rights, a notion that begets several thorny historical and sociocultural issues. What does the notion include? Should we approach them as self-evident truths, as moral categories derived from natural law, or perhaps stemming from human rational nature? Or rather, as constructed principles, product of long struggles to broaden protections and place limits on abuse and the arbitrary use of power? In terms of a vision motivating historical struggles, or as the product of broader historical processes shaping and transforming ideas? As the product of agency and process? And provided we recognize their historicity instead of claiming a perennial status for them, how were they incorporated historically?

Frequently, in covenants, treaties, and pacts – including in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – we can find long lists of specific rights, from freedoms of expression, religion and association to many other political, social, economic, and cultural rights. Historically, there have been variations and changes in the lists of recognized rights, in their relationship to duties, in the timing of their crystallization, in the conditions under which they emerged successively, in the ways they have coalesced with one another into broader

Cultural Trauma and Divisive Political Identities

Manussos Marangudakis, Kostas Rontos, and Dimitris Paraskevopoulos

Abstract

The article examines the relationship amongst cultural trauma, trust in public institutions, and political inclinations in Greece, and tests the hypothesis that cultural trauma could shape, in various degrees, the basal civil-political identity of the individual. Our quantitative research, based on a nation-wide random sample, suggests that civil-political identity is interrelated to, and possibly is preceded by deeply held worldviews informed by past traumatic events and corresponding narratives of good vs. evil. In this framework, various cultural traumas are not perceived by social actors as isolated events, but they are comprehended as episodes of an overarching grand traumatic narrative that "supports" the validity of the chosen political ideology as identity. This process generates, potentially, a multiplicity of grand traumatic narratives which clash for supremacy in the public sphere and sustain deep intergenerational divisive political and cultural identities. Our analysis indicates that in Greece there are three such grand narratives: the Nationalist, the Old Left, and the New Left, and, last a residual one, the anti-Junta narrative.

1. Introduction

"Trauma" comes from the ancient Greek verb «*τιτρώσκω*» (*causing violent shock and rupture*). "Trauma" is experienced directly (*personally*) or indirectly (*collectively – culturally*). Under the impact of the social phenomenology, the social constructionism theory and an interpretative theory of memory and remembering[1], the construction of a theory of cultural trauma is in a different direction from the study of mechanisms of traumatic memory through analysis of the clinical evidence[2]. Eyerman (2001, p. 1) highlights the distinction between trauma's impact on individuals and its role as a cultural process. In the latter case, trauma is conveyed through various forms of representation and connected to the reconstruction of collective identity and memory. Eyerman's research on cultural trauma has focused on individuals, public discourse and historical context. In particular, he used a approach to answer how individual

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1   For the study of the reconstruction of the past and the process of constructing collective/social memory, see Halbwachs (1980).
2   For a study of traumatic memory based on clinical case reports, see McNally (2003).

Navigating the Double Divide: Generative AI and the Dynamics of Inequality in Latin America

Hugo Neri amd Veridiana Domingos

Abstract

The rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence (AI) presents both opportunities and challenges for social equality, particularly in regions like Latin America, where significant socioeconomic disparities persist. This paper empirically investigates two competing hypotheses about the impact of generative AI on inequality in Latin America: (1) that AI may exacerbate existing inequalities by disproportionately benefiting more affluent regions with pre-existing technological access and skills; and (2) that AI has the potential to reduce inequality by democratizing access to educational resources, creative tools, and economic opportunities. Leveraging Google Trends data on AI-related search terms from January 2022 to January 2024, we employ a novel hierarchy of search terms as a proxy for the depth of AI engagement across different regions in Latin America and developed countries. We find evidence of a "double divide" in AI engagement – significant disparities both within Latin American countries, with AI interest concentrated in urban, affluent areas, and between Latin America and developed nations, with the region lagging in searches for specialized AI tools. Our analysis reveals a complex landscape of AI adoption, with the rapid spread of general AI awareness co-existing with persistent gaps in engagement with advanced applications. We argue that this double divide poses significant challenges for Latin America to fully harness the potential of AI for equitable development. The paper concludes by highlighting the need for nuanced, multi-pronged policy approaches that simultaneously capitalize on growing general AI interest while fostering deeper, specialized engagement. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on the social implications of AI and inform policy discussions on steering technological change towards inclusive growth in Latin America and beyond.

1. Introduction: Generative AI and inequality in Latin America

The rapid advancement and proliferation of generative artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have sparked a global discourse on their potential societal impacts (Acemoglu, 2021). In the context of Latin America, a region characterized by persistent socioeconomic disparities (Gasparini et al., 2021), the emergence of generative AI presents both promises and challenges for social equality. Here we examine two competing perspectives on the potential effects of generative AI on inequality in Latin American societies.

The first perspective posits that generative AI may exacerbate existing inequalities by disproportionately benefiting those with pre-existing technologi-

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