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CLASS, CITIZENSHIP AND INDIVIDUALIZATION IN CHINA'S MODERNIZATION

Björn Alpermann

Abstract:

Against the backdrop of China's rapid social change in recent decades, this article explores the social categorizations of class and citizenship and how these have evolved in terms of structure and discourse. In order to do so, possibilities of employing Beck's theory of second modernity to the case of China are explored. While China does not fit into Beck's theory on all accounts, it is argued here that his individualization thesis can be fruitfully employed to make sense of China's ongoing process of modernization. It may provide a welcome new starting point for analyses of China's current social developments beyond the "simple" modernization theories that still dominate in China studies.

Most experts would agree that over the past three decades China has undergone an unprecedented social transformation propelled by three general forces: economic development, especially a shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services accompanied by urbanization; an economic system transition from a socialist planned economy to a market economy; and globalization, meaning China's increasingly close integration into world markets and its related social and transnational consequences. This has led some authors to see China as falling into an East Asian pattern of "compressed modernity" (Beck and Grande 2010: 409–43; Han and Shim 2010: 471–4). What makes China's transformation all the more remarkable is that it is taking place under the unbroken leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and with only limited reforms of its Leninist political system. This combination of a market society and communist politics directly challenges long-held assumptions regarding modernization (Roetz 2006). It also prompts us to rethink our ideas about how society is ordered and reordered during processes of rapid modernization that give rise to new social hierarchies.

This article discusses social categorizations in China and how these have evolved over the past three decades. It specifically focuses on class and citizenship because scholars have held these categorizations to be of particular importance in understanding how China's experience of modernization relates to that of other societies. The article stresses the interdependencies of these two social categorizations. Moreover, the article argues that the theory of "second modernity" (or "reflexive modernization" as it has been referred to by Beck and his collaborators) is useful in getting past the "simple," i.e. non-reflexive,

CHINESE NATION-BUILDING AS, INSTEAD OF, AND BEFORE GLOBALIZATION

Andrew Kipnis

Abstract

*In this era of “globalization”, nation-building has become a relatively neglected topic. In this essay, I use Thomas Hylland Eriksen’s textbook, *Globalization*, as a framework for exploring nation-building in China. I take his eight-concept chapter outline—disembedding, acceleration, standardization, interconnectedness, movement, mixing, vulnerability, and re-embedding—and apply it to dynamics of nation-building in China. In so doing, I tease out actual and potential relationships among the processes evident in Chinese nation-building and globalization. In addition, I explore some of the relationships, productivities and pitfalls of “globalization” and “nation-building” as concepts.*

The rate of nation-building in China over the past thirty years has been spectacular. This nation-building has included a huge increase in the number of years children spend in school along with a standardization of what is taught and how it is taught, a massive investment in communications and transportation infrastructure, and the construction or rapid expansion of hundreds of cities under standardized regimes of urban planning (see Kipnis forthcoming). The relationship of this nation-building to the complex of processes referred to as “globalization” is multifaceted, but, too often, the language of globalization is used in a manner that elides the importance of nation-building in China. In this essay, I tease out the complex inter-relations between globalization and Chinese nation-building by using a textbook on the topic of globalization as an outline for discussing some of the effects of the past thirty years of nation-building in China. The very fact that a treatise on globalization provides a coherent framework for discussing nation-building speaks to the intimate relationships between the concepts. But the manner in which the parallels emerge render an explanation of Chinese nation-building as simply another form of, or, as a derivative of, globalization implausible. In addition to seeing that Chinese nation-building is a form of globalization, I also argue that Chinese nation-building occurs instead of globalization, as a prequel to future globalization and as a parallel process that resembles globalization because China is large enough to be a world into itself.

The textbook I use is Thomas Hylland Eriksen’s (2007) *Globalization*, which is part of *The Key Concepts* series published by Berg. Eriksen organizes the book

PRINCIPLES FOR COSMOPOLITAN SOCIETIES: VALUES FOR COSMOPOLITAN PLACES

John R. Gibbins

Abstract

Postmodern theory is well placed to provide a useful resource in carrying forward the project of instituting cosmopolitan morality and justice at the local level. It is qualified to contribute because the central problematic of postmodern political theory is shared by cosmopolitanism, namely, how can a multiplicity of divergent autonomous groups, with few, or no shared cultural resources, negotiate and agree to share common spaces? How, can we have political and moral order when the preconditions, normally believed to accompany these, are non-existent or unstable. Postmodern thinking also brings to the debate about cosmopolitanism, the resources that will allow for the toleration, openness and ingenuity that build upon eclecticism, pluralism, the celebration of difference, and expressivism in a period experiencing alteration, vulnerability, irony and insecurity. In approach, postmodern thinking shares with cosmopolitanism: a preference for particular narrative over grand narrative; the local over the global; particular over universal; difference over generalisation; eclecticism over absolutism; synchrony over unity; and pluralism over monism. Both approaches are resources that can help us re-learn how neighbours can live together in strange times.

In recent decades the processes of globalization and trans-nationalism, heralding cultural imbrication and restructuring, have occasioned a myriad of endings and beginnings to places, cultures, institutions and bodies. Contemporary arts, philosophies, cultural criticism and journalism have responded, with little commonality and yet with much opprobrium. But the messages of endings, crisis and incommensurability have been heard above the chatter. Many of the spaces and performances, for instance, at 'Making Worlds', the 2009 Venice Biennale, negated the mission with a series of disturbing vignettes of disorientation, dissonance and collapse of the known. Seeking solace at times of hyper change with dystopia, cynicism, nihilism and apocalypse, are as old as western history but so too are the voices of utopia, Stoicism, affirmation and new beginnings¹. Today Hellenists, humanists and affirmative postmodernists, amongst other coteries of actors, engage in thinking, finding and making new beginnings in contrast to making careers in panic, paranoia, disaster and doom.

1 Rosenau, P.M. 1992. *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads and Intrusions*, Princeton: Princeton university Press. 14–17, 138–166. I acknowledge the co-authorship of Bo Reimer in the production of the original ideas about identity within postmodernism, and for his continuing inspiration and friendship over several decades.

MODERNIZING CHINESE LAW: THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN CHINA

Sanzhu Zhu

Abstract

Over the past three decades a progressive transformation of the law and legal institutions in China took place as part and parcel of China's broader modernization process driven by economic reform and development. The recognition and protection of private property as embodied in the amendment of the 1982 Constitution, the 2007 Property Law and other legislations, is one of the stories contributing to the transformation of modern Chinese law and legal institutions, which reflects a historical modernization process of socio-economic change in contemporary China. However, this study by examining the development of a legal framework for the protection of private property, the problems related to urban housing demolition, and the rule of law in relation to the protection of private property, submits that the legal modernization in the protection of private property had no radical departure from, but confined within and compromised with, China's current existing systems which, among others, still uphold socialist ideology and practice.

The modernization process of the law and legal institutions of the People's Republic of China (PRC) which started in 1979¹ in the aftermath of turmoil ten years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) has transformed Chinese law and legal institutions in many aspects.² Recognition and protection of private property is one of the modernization progresses taking place in the wake of China's economic reform and establishment of a market economy. In the latest legislative confirmation, the 2007 Property Law of the PRC recognizes for the first time the protection of private property at the same level as the protection of public property, which marks an important step forward in modernizing a legal framework for the protection of private property in China.³

- 1 The enactment of seven major laws in 1979 marked a beginning of a renewed modernization process of China's law and legal institutions in the post-Mao China. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law were among the seven laws enacted at the second session of the 5th National People's Congress on June 18 to July 1, 1979.
- 2 See Zhu, Sanzhu "Modern Chinese Law and Institutions Sixty Years On", introduction to *Law and Institutions of Modern China* (4 vols.), edited by Sanzhu Zhu (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
- 3 The Property Law was adopted by the 10th National People's Congress on March 16, 2007, effective as of October 1, 2007. Article 4 states: "The state, collective and private property rights and the property rights of other interested parties are protected by law; no units and individual may infringe upon such rights." For a discussion of this law, see Mo Zhang, "From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property

CHINESE ORGANIZATIONS AS GROUPS OF PEOPLE – TOWARDS A CHINESE BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Peter J. Peverelli

Abstract

Business is booming in China and so are Business Administration courses. However, these courses do not always seem to prepare their students for the job of managing Chinese organizations. In order to design better courses, we first need to look deeper into the nature of Chinese organizations. A number of Chinese scholars have realized this and started looking at Chinese intellectual traditions, in particular Confucian thought, to discern the differences between Western organizations (for which most globally used MBA courses have been designed) and their Chinese counterparts. This has already led to interesting new insights. However, predicates like 'Chinese' or 'Confucian' make it difficult to apply the new finding, more generally. This paper acknowledges the findings, but proposes an alternative organization theory that can not only find and explain the Chinese-ness of Chinese organizations, but can be applied globally, to determine local modes of organizing

Preamble

This is an exploratory paper. As someone who advises European companies in their long term relations with Chinese partners in practice, and is simultaneously involved in academic business administration programs in Europe and China, or more precisely, adapting such courses developed in Europe for a Chinese audience, I am regularly exposed to the differences between European and Chinese organizations and the consequences of those differences for academic research and teaching of business processes.

In Europe, we have been debating the existence of an indigenous European business administration, as opposed to the US dominated MBA type of courses, and seem still quite far from drawing conclusions (Calori & de Woot 1994, Boone & van den Bosch 1997, Pudelko & Harzing 2007).

In fact, on the global level, the divergence—convergence debate, i.e. the debate whether the trend in the global business world is towards the development of multiple local business models, or towards one unified global model, is still going on as well (see Ohmae (1990) and Whitley (1993) as proponents for the convergence and divergence points of view respectively, and Chan & Peverelli (2010) for an alternative point of view).

On one hand, this may make us less than ideal teachers for our Chinese

INCOME GAPS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: DIFFERENCES AMONG REGIONS, OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND ETHNIC GROUPS

Ma Rong

Abstract

The income gap in Chinese society has increased significantly in recent years. This disparity can be confirmed by the critical level of China's current Gini coefficient. In response, questions concerning social stratification and mobility in China, and how to improve China's income distribution have become key discussions among Chinese sociologists.

The income gap, a result of economic development, can be examined via discussions of income disparity between different regions, occupational groups and ethnic groups. Previous analyses based on official government and academic statistical data have tended to focus primarily on regional and occupational differences in relation to income disparity. However, the income gap exhibited between different ethnic groups is in effect directly linked to inconsistencies in income acquisition and employment opportunities. Furthermore, this link is intimately related to China's national policies in ethnic affairs.

During the last three decades of reform and opening-up (*gaige kaifang*), China has experienced a phenomenal rate of economic growth and a rapid accumulation of social wealth. This development has been directly related to the reform of China's economic system, its opening up to foreign markets and the development of a market economy. China's citizens' newly found social wealth has resulted in a Chinese society that no longer resembles its previous "iron rice bowl" (*daguofan*) system of egalitarianism under a central planning economy. As the development of new avenues through which to participate in the labour market and other markets have become apparent, such as stock and real estate investments, accordingly new options to gain employment and income have been made available to Chinese citizens. Moreover, the development of a "socialist" market economy and the opening of China's economy to the world labour market have resulted in the emergence of new patterns of social mobility. In particular, those who have been exposed to higher levels of education have developed a greater ability to enter new industries and make more specific career choices. Of course, we do not deny that illegal money-making schemes (for example, corruption and bribes), unjust forms of income (for example, double-track price systems and industry monopolies) and other social problems do not exist in China. On the contrary, in order to resolve and overcome such issues, these existing problems require continual reform and democratic supervision.

SIGNS AND WONDERS: CHRISTIANITY AND HYBRID MODERNITY IN CHINA

Richard Madsen

Abstract

The Protestant Christianity that came to China in the 19th century was mostly a “modernizing” Christianity that promoted the transition to what Charles Taylor calls an “immanent frame”—a disenchanted world based on natural laws, knowable through scientific reason, which can be used by humans for their mutual benefit. Within this immanent frame, religion is a matter of private belief that cultivates good personal moral character. And there is no place for “signs and wonders”—miracles that suspend the laws of nature. But Chinese modernity has turned out to be a hybrid kind. Especially (but by no means exclusively) in the countryside, the immanent modernity brought from the West has mingled with the enchanted world carried down from Chinese traditions. One sign of this is the prevalence of “signs and wonders” popular Christianity, which has been the most rapidly growing form of Christianity in China. The history of Catholicism in China has similarities to these developments.

When asked by messengers of John the Baptist how they could know that Jesus was the Messiah, Jesus replied: “Go back and tell John what you have seen and heard: the blind see again, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised to life, the good news is proclaimed to the poor and happy is the man who does not lose faith in me.” (Luke: 22–23) The most rapidly growing segments of Christianity in China today are full of signs and wonders—miracles of healing, exorcisms, ecstatic experiences in which believers are seemingly transported to another world, visions of Jesus or (for Catholics) of the Virgin Mary. The prevalence of belief in these signs and wonders is puzzling to—indeed scandalous for—most secular social scientists, not to mention Chinese government officials.

Modern social scientists are committed to explaining the world through reason—logic and facts—and they base their work on an assumption that nature is governed by unbreakable physical laws that do not allow for miracles. Within this framework, if people perceive signs and wonders the cause must be psychological, a transformation of perception by emotional forces that override the capacity to see the truth through reason. The challenge for social scientists is how to explain these psychological (mis)perceptions in terms of logic and empirically observed facts. And how to explain the accelerating acceptance of belief in such impossible signs and wonders.

CONFUCIANISM, PURITANISM, AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL: CHINA AND AMERICA

Thorsten Botz-Bornstein

Abstract:

Max Weber examined Chinese society and European Puritanism at the beginning of the Twentieth Century in order to find out why capitalism did not develop in China. He found that Confucianism and Puritanism are mutually exclusive, which enabled him to oppose both in the form of two different kinds of rationalism. I attempt neither to refute nor to confirm the Weberian thought model. Instead I show that a similar model applies to Jean Baudrillard's vision of American culture, a culture that he determined in terms of hyperreality. Instead of rejecting Weber's thoughts right away, I give Weber's model a further push and show that through a further twist that "Western culture" has received within particular American constellations, Weber's understanding of Confucianism and Baudrillard's understanding of American civilization manifest amazing similarities.

Max Weber examined Confucianism and European Puritanism at the beginning of the twentieth century in order to find out why capitalism did not develop in China. He found that Confucianism and Puritanism are mutually exclusive, which enabled him to oppose both in the form of two different kinds of rationalism. Traditionally, Weber's analysis of Confucianism presents an opposing view to the capitalist, liberal West and shows that both cultures are incompatible. Though both Confucianism and Puritanism are rational and encourage self-control, for Weber, "Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world [while] Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world" (Weber 1915–20: 534/248).

Weber's findings have been discredited. More recent considerations of Chinese thought, especially those that emerged in the 1980s, have found that Confucianism *can* be interpreted as correlative with Western Protestantism, the main reasons being Confucianism's high evaluation of education, its dedication to hard work, and the priority given to group over individual interests. Herman Kahn refers to Weber's Puritan ethics to summarize the Western misinterpretations of Confucianism: "Most readers of this book are familiar with the argument of Max Weber that the Protestant ethic was extremely useful in promoting the rise and spread of modernization. Most readers, however, will be less familiar with the notion that has gradually emerged in the last two decades that "societies based upon the Confucian ethic may in many ways be superior to the West in the pursuit of industri-

CHINA AND THE TOWN SQUARE TEST

Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom

Abstract

This essay assesses the way that issues relating to freedom of speech and public and private forms of dissent have and have not changed in the People's Republic of China in recent decades. It looks at the way China's unusual trajectory suggests that Nathan Sharansky's famous "town square test," which is often used to divide countries along a single axis (with "free" nations on one side, "fear" nations on the other) is problematic. The need to take regional variations within China into account is one theme that is stressed.

How free a country is today's People's Republic of China (PRC)? It is clearly not an open and democratic nation, where any newspaper can run editorials castigating government policies and opposition parties can take actions without worrying about consequences. And yet, it is also clearly a place where many people have many more choices in some aspects of their lives than was true in the various points during the Mao era (1949–1976). So how should it be categorized? And what should we make of the fact that some kinds of protests are tolerated and others are not? These are hard questions to answer in part because China has become a country that confounds many of the standard frameworks for thinking about Communist Party-run states that were promulgated during the Cold War. For example, it is still a country where many forms of speech and publication are censored, and this continues to lead commentators to refer to China as an Orwellian state. And yet, when Central and Eastern European countries were the main poster children for 1984 states in earlier times, they were countries where Orwell could only be read in underground editions and a writer daring to portray the current system in dystopian terms would be arrested and punished, or if the holder of a foreign passport expelled from the country. In China, though, a dramatic version of *Animal Farm* has been performed in Beijing without repercussions for the producers of the play. And Chan Koonchung, the author of a dystopian novel set in a China of the near future (Chan, 2011), which many have likened to 1984, continues to live and work and give public talks in Beijing, even though his book can only circulate there in underground editions. How can we make sense of such a country?

These are the sorts of questions that I will wrestle with in this essay. They have been addressed by many scholars, including those who contributed to a "China Since Tiananmen" symposium that ran in the July 2009 issue of the *Journal of*

METAPHOR, POETRY AND CULTURAL IMPLICATURE

Ying Zhang

Abstract

Metaphor has been a feature of poetry for centuries. Some metaphorical phenomena in poetry raise questions for the traditional framework, in which metaphor is a matter of the metaphorical use of individual words. White does not adopt the traditional view. He introduces a sentence-approach instead. I argue that the alleged phenomena occur in the Chinese poetry as well. I argue further, that White's structure of representing metaphor can be used to analyze metaphor in the Chinese poetry, but that it must be constructed on the basis of working out the relevant cultural implicatures. In effect, interpreting a metaphor involves generating the cultural implicature where a literary quotation is being alluded to, because the quotation acts as the key to understanding the metaphor in the poetry.

I. Introduction

In a metaphorical sentence, 'Tolstoy was a great infant', some words (such as 'infant') are used metaphorically, while others are used non-metaphorically (such as 'Tolstoy' and 'was'). White (1996) names the latter *primary vocabulary* (marked by underline) and the former *secondary vocabulary* (marked by wave underline). A metaphor is composed of these two different kinds of vocabularies, with the secondary vocabulary introducing the metaphorical comparison. Thus we may get:

- (1) Tolstoy was a great infant.
- or
- (2) Tolstoy was a great infant.

In (1), 'great' belongs to the primary vocabulary, and in (2) it belongs to the secondary vocabulary. Both the primary vocabulary and secondary vocabulary are used as a bridge to arrive at White's final destination, where he gives prominence to metaphorical sentence. To put in his words, metaphor is constituted by conflating two situations rather than holding a *focus* within a *frame*¹.

1 According to Black (1955), 'infant' is the *focus* of the metaphor, and the sentence conveys its intended meaning through the interaction between 'infant' and 'Tolstoy'. In this paper, I refer